Contribution of foreign direct investment to poverty reduction : the case of Vietnam in the 1990s by Hemmer, Hans-Rimbert & Phuong Hoa, Nguyen Thi
 
Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen 
Professur für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Entwicklungsländerforschung 
(Institute for Development Economics) 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Rimbert Hemmer 
D-35394 Giessen/Germany         •          Licher Str. 66 
Tel: ++49 (0)641 99 22200 • Fax: ++49 (0)641 99 22209 • E-mail: www-vwl6@wirtschaft-uni-giessen.de 
 
Entwicklungsökonomische Diskussionsbeiträge ● Discussion Papers in Development Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to Poverty Reduction: the 
Case of Vietnam in the 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
Hans-Rimbert Hemmer 
Nguyen Thi Phuong Hoa 
 
 
No. 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bonn, November 2002 
 II 
Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to Poverty Reduction: The 
Case of Vietnam in the 1990s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the current context of increasing globalisation, there exist many arguments against it in 
that it does not benefit the poor. Globalisation through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
might do nothing for the poor since foreign investors usually recruit skilled workers who 
are likely to be non-poor. FDI may outcompete local small enterprises making local 
workers become poor or the poor workers worse. Nevertheless, whether this presumption 
is true in every developing country is still open to discussion. 
 
The paper aims at analysing impacts of FDI on poverty reduction in Vietnam in the 1990s 
because following the economic reform in the late 1980s Vietnam achieved high 
economic growth, rapid poverty reduction, increasing FDI and trade. FDI is also  
considered an integral component of the economy. Hence to what extent FDI contributes 
to poverty reduction may be a relevant question to the country that was characterised by 
widespread poverty in the 1980s.   
 
The paper analyses FDI’s impact on poverty reduction in Vietnam through direct and 
indirect impacts. The direct impact of FDI works through employment creation and it is 
estimated to be negative but insignificant. The indirect impact of FDI works through 
FDI’s effect on economic growth and through FDI’s contribution to the local budgets. 
Regarding FDI’s contribution to growth, estimated coefficients are significantly positive 
based on panel data covering 61 provinces of Vietnam and the 1990-2000 period. 
Furthermore, FDI interacts positively with local human capital in affecting economic 
growth. Economic growth is then estimated to exert significantly positive impacts on the 
magnitude of poverty reduction results. Therefore, FDI has indirectly helped reduce 
poverty in Vietnam. Regarding FDI’s contribution to the local budget, this effect remains 
insignificant.  
 
Globalisation through FDI thus benefits the poor. Policy implications then include 
policies that help attract FDI continuously, policies that facilitate the implementation of 
registered foreign investment projects and policies that upgrade the quality of the labour 
workforce. 
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Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment to Poverty Reduction: The 
Case of Vietnam in the 1990s 
 
                                                                                                                          
 
1. Introduction 
 
The last decades of the twentieth century were marked by increasing globalisation. There 
is increasing evidence that globalisation helps raise economic growth (Dollar and Kraay, 
2001b and 2002; Schiff et al., 2002; Hoekman et al., 2001). However, there exist many 
arguments against globalisation in the sense that it does not benefit the poor (Mazur 
2000; Forsyth quoted in Ravallion, 2001). Globalisation through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) may quite be possible to do nothing for the poor. This is because 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) usually recruit skilled workers who are likely to be 
non-poor. In addition, FDI may outcompete local small enterprises making local workers 
become poor or the poor workers worse. Nevertheless, whether this prejudice is true in 
every developing country is still open to discussion.  
 
This paper aims at analysing impacts of FDI on poverty reduction in Vietnam in the 
1990s quantitatively. The reason for choosing this topic is because during the 1990s, 
Vietnam changed significantly and comprehensively and FDI was seen as a considerable 
influence. Since 1986, to deal with the problems of underdevelopment, the Government 
of Vietnam (GoV) has carried out ambitious structural and institutional reforms that 
encompass promoting the domestic private and foreign sectors, liberalising prices, 
decollectivising agriculture etc. After fifteen years of ‘renovation’, Vietnam has obtained 
significant economic improvements while maintaining macroeconomic stability. Rural 
hunger has been eradicated, and the country has quickly changed from the position of 
importing food to the leading exporter of rice, coffee and pepper in the world. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grows at an average rate of 7% annually (World Bank, 
2000/2001; World Bank, 1999) while poverty was reduced from 58% in 1993 to 37% in 
1998 (World Bank, 1999a). Inflation has been reduced from three digits in 1986 to single 
digit in the 1990s.  
 
Within the renovation package that has brought such results, opening the economy to 
foreign investors is a policy of considerable importance. This policy of the GoV in 
addition to other factors (economic and political stability, high economic growth, rich 
natural resources, relatively well-educated and low-cost labour force) has attracted FDI to 
Vietnam quickly. From USD 371 million in 1988, registered capital of FDI rose to USD 
8,497 million in 1996.  In relative terms, implemented FDI in Vietnam recorded an 
exceptionally high level (7.2% of GDP in 1997) compared with other developing 
countries (4.9% in China, 2.2% in Indonesia, 5.2% in Malaysia, 2.4% in Thailand and 
1.5% in the Philippines)1.  
 
Very recently, the Government of Vietnam (GoV) has officially acknowledged that FDI 
is an integral component of the economy and the government has therefore affirmed its 
                                                           
1 World Bank (1999b): World Development Indicators, pp. 270-72. 
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long-term strategy to attract FDI. As one way of evaluating FDI’s contributions to the 
country, examining FDI’s impacts on poverty reduction is relevant in the context of a 
country where the poor and people who live just above the poverty line account for a 
large part of the whole population. 
 
The paper presents theoretical arguments on FDI’s influences on poverty in Section 2. 
Models that capture such influences are then developed and introduced. Basing on these 
models, estimation results using Vietnamese data are shown in Section 3. The results 
confirm that globalisation through FDI benefit the poor in Vietnam. Conclusions and 
policy implications follow in Section 4. 
 
2. How does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Poverty? 
 
2.1 Arguments from the Literature 
 
FDI’s influences on poverty reduction can be classified into indirect and direct impacts. 
The indirect impact works through FDI’s contribution to economic growth given the 
increasingly accepted role of economic growth in poverty reduction (World Bank 
2000/2001; IFC 2000; Dollar and Kraay 2001a). In addition, FDI contributes to tax 
income of the state budget and may thus facilitate government-led programs for the poor 
(Klein et al. 2000, pp. 2-3). Moreover, FDI may induce host governments to invest in 
infrastructure. If this investment is in poor areas it may benefit the local poor. The direct 
impact of FDI on poverty is assumed to be its effects on unemployment (Chudnovsky and 
Lopez, 1999; IFC, 2000; Saravanamuttoo, 1999).  
 
Indirect Effects of FDI on Poverty 
 
Regarding FDI’s indirect impact on poverty, FDI may affect economic growth through 
raising total capital formation. This is because FDI provides external finance and may 
help reduce financial constraints on investment due to low savings in LDCs. Moreover, 
FDI may crowd in domestic investment through backward and forward linkages further 
pushing economic growth. In addition, inward investment may induce local governments 
to invest in infrastructure like roads, bridges, harbors, water and electricity supply which 
might facilitate domestic investment as well. Externalities and spillover effects that 
foreign-invested enterprises may have on domestic ones horizontally and/or vertically2 
have also been recognized as a benefit accruing to host LDCs (Burger, 1999). More 
importantly, FDI may bring technology, know-how, management and marketing skills to 
LDCs representing something more than a simple import of capital (Blomström and 
Kokko, 1996). According to Caves (quoted in Andersson 1989, p. 34), this is considered 
as the most powerful effect on growth of FDI. 
 
                                                           
2 Horizontal effects occur when there is dissemination of skills, say in advertising, managing, maintaining, 
quality-product controlling, from foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to domestic ones that produce the 
same products, and hence, compete with FIEs. 
Vertical effects occur when there is dissemination of skills from FIEs to domestic ones that supply inputs to 
FIEs or sell FIEs’ products. 
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Technology Diffusion Impacts of FIEs on local counterparts include (i) technology 
(including organizational technology) transfer and (ii) technology dissemination.  
 
i) Technology transfer is a formal transfer of technology that works through markets (for 
example, licensing, joint ventures).  
 
FDI involves technology transfer to host countries in the sense that transnational 
corporations (TNCs) transfer their physical goods and tacit knowledge, which comprises 
new skills, technical and organisational capabilities to foreign affiliates and other local 
related parties in concomitant with injecting capital activities (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 203). 
Technology transfer through FDI is thus an internalised transfer or an intra-firm transfer, 
as distinguished from externalised transfer like licensing. Through FDI, more 
technologies become available in host countries, or host countries can use a larger range 
of technology and expand their productive base. Moreover, generally new, valuable 
technologies are more likely to be transferred through FDI than through licensing to 
unrelated parties to TNCs because of imperfect technology markets aforementioned. In 
addition, the continued stake of foreign investors in FIEs may induce them to keep the 
enterprises updated with technology. In principle, FDI provides an access to the whole 
range of TNC technological, organizational and skill assets. 
 
ii) Technology dissemination and spillover: these effects occur in informal, non-market 
mediated channels. They imply the productivity or efficiency benefits accruing to host 
country enterprises due to the presence of FIEs and these cannot be reaped by FIEs 
(Blomström and Kokko, 1996). Technology dissemination thus represents an externality 
or unintentional technology transfer from FIEs. Generally, the less firm-specific the 
technology the wider the spillover is. Spillovers may be found in different forms: 
imitation, reverse engineering3 and spillover from competition. 
 
Technology dissemination and spillover can occur through different channels: 
 
a) Vertical linkage: FIEs may give technical assistance to their suppliers or buyers. Close 
linkages between FIEs and their local upstream suppliers or subcontractors and 
downstream distributors seem more likely to lead to (uncompensated) technology 
dissemination (Blomström et al., 1999, p. 13). They may also induce workers in FIEs to 
turn to FIEs’ customers or suppliers, and thereby disseminating technology from FIEs.  
 
Technology dissemination through vertical linkages in this sense depends on local 
content requirements, ownership requirements, the technical capability (the absorptive 
capability) of local suppliers or customers and (local) market size. Though formal 
technology diffusion requirements seem to promote technology dissemination 
notoriously, empirical results do not support this (Kokko and Blomström, 1995; 
Blomström et al., 1999). This is  because these policies may discourage FDI inflows and 
therefore dissemination effects. Only local technical capability is a widely accepted 
determinant of technology dissemination in empirical studies (Kokko and Blomström, 
                                                           
3 Reverse engineering implies activities of taking apart and analysing products in order to learn about the 
technologies embodied in them. 
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1995; UNCTAD, 1999). Market size may affect technology dissemination since in large 
economies, there may be multiple suppliers and distributors of FIEs, so vertical linkages 
may be more likely to occur, assuming that local technological capability is not so 
backward.  
   
b) Labour turnover: technology is embodied not only in equipment, expatriate managers 
and technicians but also in workers in FIEs. This is acquired through either FIEs’ formal 
training or non-formal training aforementioned. Labour turnover may disseminate 
technology to other companies in the domestic economy when workers trained or 
employed by FIEs switch to domestic employers or start running their own business.  
 
This fact may induce foreign investors to pay efficiency wages to productive employees 
in order to keep them in the FIEs. In other cases, it may discourage foreign investors to 
invest in local human capital or in host countries that in turn may have more adverse 
effects on long-run economic growth of host countries. Thus, labour turnover limitations 
have been conducted in some developing countries.  
 
c) Demonstration effect: this effect refers to the fact that successful introductions of new 
products or new processes by FIEs may reduce the risk and information costs associated 
with the adoption of those products or processes thereby stimulating domestic enterprises 
to follow up through imitation or reverse engineering (i. e. learning-by-watching). This is 
because in the absence of FIEs, it may be very costly for domestic firms to collect 
information on new products or processes (Saggi, 2000). The point is that FDI may 
expand the set of technology available to local enterprises.  
 
The demonstration effect hence tends to depend on the pool of FDI, the technology gap 
between foreign and local firms and on the competitive environment. The larger the pool 
of FDI, the greater the possibility that domestic investors can choose the most suitable 
activity to imitate. The technology gap matters because there might be little scope for 
domestic enterprises to learn and imitate when foreign technology far exceeds domestic 
technology. However, this may not be the case if the local workforce possesses a 
sufficiently high level of education and training. This situation may to some extent be 
found in Vietnam since the GoV has long pursued policies that promote education while 
investment activities, except that of state-owned enterprises, have been discriminated. 
The competitive environment might motivate domestic firms to adopt foreign technology 
in order to successfully compete with foreign firms. This in turn may induce foreign 
firms, facing increased spillovers, to use technology with lower quality thereby affecting 
adversely the demonstration process. Hence the net impact of a competitive environment 
on the demonstration effect is somehow inconclusive.   
  
d) Market structure effect: The presence of foreign affiliates may make the market more 
competitive. As a result, local firms, in facing increased competition, tend to use their 
existing factors of production more efficiently or adopt new foreign technology quicker. 
This may, on the one hand, stimulate foreign enterprises to introduce new technology 
quicker to get a superior position; on the other hand, it may induce them to use  
technology with lower quality to reduce leakage to domestic firms.  
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Given the positive effects of FDI on local economic growth, the indirect impact of FDI 
on local poverty then depends upon how economic growth affects poverty. Theoretically, 
this may occur through different channels. Firstly, economic growth may affect poverty 
through its impact on investment and employment. On the supply side, according to the 
flexible accelerator principle, ‘an increase in the growth rate of output-an acceleration-is 
needed to increase the level of investment’ (Branson, 1989). On the demand side, as an 
economy grows there is increasing demand for existing products or arising demand for 
new products (UNCTAD, 1999) thereby raising demand for investment. Since investment 
and technology innovation are the main drive for jobs and worker income, poverty may 
be improved. Secondly, economic growth may improve (national and local) budgets 
thereby facilitating (national and local) government spendings on social programs, that 
may directly aim at the poor, and on public investment in infrastructure especially in poor 
areas. This may create more jobs for the local poor as well as improve their life 
environment. World Bank (2000/2001) concluded that economic growth is the single 
most important influence on poverty. 
 
In addition to the effects on growth, FDI may affect local poverty through its 
contributions to the budget of the host country and through its effect on government 
investment. FDI’s contribution, notably in terms of tax and fee payments, allows the host 
to raise its spendings on social programs. If these programs are targeted at the poor, say, 
investing in irrigation systems, in rural roads, schools, clean water, health care, FDI may 
considerably contribute to local poverty reduction. Moreover, FDI may induce local 
governments to invest in infrastructure (roads, electricity, water and sanitation supply, 
etc.) in a way that it benefits the local poor. 
 
Direct Effects of FDI on Poverty 
 
FDI’s direct impacts on poverty may work through providing opportunities, particularly 
providing jobs and training to local workers. To the extent that foreign capital inflows do 
not replace local investment absolutely and foreign investment takes the mode of green-
field investment FDI may contribute to reducing existing unemployment and 
underemployment, providing people with income and therefore directly contributing to 
poverty reduction. In this sense FDI’s impact on poverty works through its impacts on 
employment. This impact has been considered a major impact of FDI on poverty 
(Chudnovsky and Lopez 1999, IFC 2000, Saravanamuttoo 1999). 
 
FDI’s impacts on employment refers not only to employment created within FIEs (direct 
employment) but also to employment created in related entities vertically or horizontally 
or macroeconomically (indirect employment) (UNCTAD 1994, pp. 192-95). With direct 
employment, FDI may reduce unemployment or underemployment when it comes under 
the mode of green-field investment. Green-field investment implies investment which 
relates to producing distinctive products without close substitutes in the host country. 
Conversely, FDI may raise unemployment when it is a merge-and-acquisition (M&A) 
activity. This is because M&A activities are usually followed by restructuring the merged 
enterprise in accordance with the objectives underlying the M&A (UNCTAD, 1999, p. 
261). However, when FDI takes the mode of merge-and-acquisition of moribund 
enterprises it may help prevent potentially increased unemployment and therefore 
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poverty. In other situations, foreign investors may preempt investment opportunities for 
any local firms, the resulting direct unemployment impact may not be of great value since 
similar results would have been occurred otherwise. With regard to indirect employment 
in vertically related entities, including backward (or upstream) linkages like suppliers, 
subcontractors, service providers and forward (or downstream) linkages like distributors, 
service agents, FDI’s implication is more complicated. It may raise employment in 
backward-linkage entities when it purchases raw materials, spare parts, components and 
services from them helping them extend operations. On the contrary, FDI may have no 
effect or even negative effects when it relies on imported inputs. Similarly, FDI may have 
a positive impact on employment in forward-linkage entities when using local 
distributors or may not have any positive impact otherwise. With regard to indirect 
employment in horizontally related entities like local enterprises competing in the same 
industries with foreign affiliates, FDI may have a negative impact when it outcompetes 
these local entities. This kind of effect is especially significant when foreign affiliates 
with capital intensive and knowledge intensive technologies replace small, and usually 
labour intensive, enterprises.   This may quite be the case since foreign investors are 
supposed to possess a large pool of technology that may grant them a higher productivity 
compared with their domestic counterparts equipped with poorer technologies. In 
contrast, FDI may have a positive impact when it helps the domestic enterprises raise the 
productivity or the quality of products, unintentionally or compulsory by host 
governments, thereby expanding their access to the foreign market for example. 
Macroeconomic effects of FDI on employment refer to employment indirectly generated 
in the host economy as a result of spending of FIEs’ workers or shareholders or 
employment indirectly replaced due to crowding out effects (UNCTAD 1994, p. 192). 
 
In the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, FDI to developing countries may 
generate adverse effects on unemployment and poverty. This is because (unskilled) 
labour abundance is assumed to be prevalent in LDCs and this engenders lower relative 
price of (unskilled) labour compared with developed countries and results in higher 
relative production of labour-intensive products than in developed countries. FDI inflow 
may therefore lead to an increase in production of capital-intensive products and a 
shrinking in the traditional, labour-intensive, sector provided that relative product prices 
are unchanged, relative factor prices are constant and production technology is the same 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997, pp. 74-76; 86). This kind of outsourcing activities may, 
however, be regarded by developed countries as relatively labour-intensive ones 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Demand for skilled labour in the capital-intensive sector in 
LDCs may thus increase while that for unskilled workers may be left unchanged or even 
adversely affected. In this sense, FDI’s implication on unemployment, especially of 
unskilled workers, and therefore FDI’s implication on poverty, will be adverse.  
 
Hence the impacts of FDI on employment are complicated and it is hard to predict the net 
result. Moreover, assessing FDI’s impacts may need to take into account its possibly 
dynamic impacts. Although employment contraction may occur in the short-run as 
domestic firms adjust to the competitive pressures from FIEs, in the longer run, 
employment prospect may improve as domestic firms adapt to the new environment and 
economic growth induced by FIEs occurs.  
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Given the potential role of FDI with respect to employment creation and the practice of 
high unemployment and underemployment in host LDCs, some governments in the host 
LDCs establish export-processing zones (EPZs) to attract resource-seeking investment by 
low labour cost, and somewhere, loosen labour standards, among other factors. Though 
there are widespread issues in these EPZs (ILO 2001), they provide workers with income 
that otherwise some of them would not have. The fact that FDI in the labor intensive 
sectors that entail little training like clothing, food processing, electronic assembly 
industries tend to employ mainly young women may improve the poverty state of low-
skilled women workers.  
 
FDI’s implications on poverty do not work only through increased employment but the 
quality of employment and the location of employment created are also of concern. FIEs 
may reduce underemployment in host LDCs by offering jobs with higher pay, better 
working conditions, training and promotion. FDI in low-wage, low-skill labour industries 
without or with negligible training or upgrading human capital may help reduce poverty 
in the short-run but not in the long-run. With less investment in physical and human 
capital like inward investment in garments, footwear, or electronic assembly, this kind of 
FDI locks workers in a low-skill state and it can easily move to new places having lower 
labour costs thereby leaving workers become redundant. In this sense, it is not only that 
an employment is offered to the poor but also which kind of employment being created 
and the sustainability of the employment are of relevance to help the poor. In other cases, 
the presence of FIEs may erode the wage level as domestic enterprises now try to 
compete by reducing labour costs.   
 
Location of employment created by FDI seems to be of direct relevance to poverty 
reduction. FIEs in areas with high unemployment or underemployment, loosely speaking, 
poor areas, may raise income directly in such areas. Similarly, in case FDI stimulate 
migration of domestic investors to poor areas with widespread unemployment or 
underemployment, it is considered to reduce poverty as well. However, these effects 
seem rarely to occur except the case of resource-seeking FDI or the host governments 
have policies to promote investment in such areas to exploit excess labour supply. To the 
extent that FDI locates in congested urban areas with good infrastructures it may just 
worsen income distribution and its implication on poverty seem thus negligible. 
Likewise, FIEs that crowd out local producers in poor areas by their competitiveness or 
by reliance on imports adversely affect poverty. 
 
Apart from the impact on unemployment and underemployment, FDI may have indirect 
impact on poverty through its impact on public investment. As infrastructure is a 
determinant of FDI aforementioned, FDI may induce host governments to invest in 
infrastructure. If this investment is in poor areas it may benefit the local poor. 
 
2.2 Foreign Direct Investment and its Impact on Growth in an Endogenous Model  
 
FDI’s contribution to long-term growth through its effect on the rate of technological 
dissemination from developed economies to less developed ones is modeled in an 
endogenous model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapters 6 and 8). This leader-
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follower model concentrates on describing technology spread from leading economies, 
namely country 1, to follower economies, namely country 2, and incorporates the role of 
FDI in the process of technology diffusion. In the model, the level of technology is 
assumed to correspond to the number of varieties of intermediate products that are 
invented by country 1, N1. Entrepreneurs in country 1 are assumed to be innovators and 
first users of intermediate goods while entrepreneurs in country 2 are assumed not to 
invent but to imitate or adapt the intermediate goods that are discovered by country 1. N2 
is thus supposed to be a subset of N1. Assuming that the number of varieties of 
intermediate goods in country 2, N2, is much smaller than N1, imitation can last for a 
rather long time. The model assumes the production function of the follower (country 2) 
as: 
Y2=A2⋅K2α⋅(u2L2h2)β=A2⋅ ( )
α
∑
=
2
1
2
N
j
jX ⋅(u2L2h2)
β  (2.1) 
where 0<α, β<1; Y1 and Y2 are the production output in country 1 and 2; A1 and A2 are 
productivity parameters denoting the government policies in country 1 and 2; L 
represents the number of workers. h denotes the human capital stock of a worker. u 
implies the fraction of the worker’s time allocated to production. (1-u) is the fraction of 
the worker’s time allocated to human capital accumulation.  
 
Assuming that the production of human capital requires no physical capital, the 
transitional dynamics of physical and human capital is then governed by the following 
constraints: 
 
t
X
N
j
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∂
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Let m2j denote the marginal product of X2j then: 
m2j=
jdX
dY
2
2 =A2⋅α⋅(u2L2h2)β⋅X2jα-1    (2.2) 
Assuming for simplicity that prices of capital goods are equal and equal to 1, then the 
flow of profit, Π, to the firms in country 2 from sales of production using X2j is: 
Π2=-v+ ( ) dseXXm tsr
t
jjj
)(
1
222
−−
−
∞
⋅−∫
α
,   (2.3) 
where v is a setup cost when a new type of capital can be utilized in production. If the 
new capital comes from foreign countries, v represents the cost of imitating, or adapting 
the new capital of the country 1 into the country 2. v is hence assumed to relate to the 
number of varieties of intermediate goods, i.e. N1 and N2, but not the number of 
intermediate goods themselves.  
 
In addition, v is assumed to be adversely related to the amount of FDI in country 2. There 
are many explanations for this relationship. Firstly, this may be because foreign investors 
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are more familiar to their inventions and hence may be better suited than local investors 
in adapting their inventions in foreign countries given the advantages of local 
entrepreneurs in terms of language, customs (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 277). 
Secondly, the negative impact of FDI on v may occur through direct linkages between 
foreign investors and local suppliers and/or buyers. Thirdly, the impact may come into 
effect through spillover aforementioned.  
 
Maximizing (2.3) gives: 
0
1
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222
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2
=
′⋅+−
=
∂
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jjj
j e
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Subjecting this to (2.2) yields: 
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Rearranging this results in:  
α
1
2 =jm      (2.4) 
Free entry in the country 2 implies that Π2=0, hence:  
v= ( ) ( )
r
XXm
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t
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222)(
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−
=⋅− ∫∞ −−   (2.5) 
Substituting (2.4) into (2.5) gives: 
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Assuming that individuals maximize the following intertemporal utility function: 
Ut= dse
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The optimal consumption path is  
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t  
In a steady state equilibrium, g(C)=g(Y) then 
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σ
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The result shows that the growth rate is positively related to human capital and labour 
force and is negatively related to the setup cost v. The setup cost v is argued to be 
negatively related to the amount of FDI aforementioned. The theoretical positive impact 
of FDI on economic growth in equation (2.7) can be explained in the way that FDI help 
reduce the cost of introducing new capital goods in the host country thereby increasing 
the rate at which new capital goods are introduced and the growth rate of the host 
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country. If we consider the production function (2.1) at the (provincial or) country level, 
the growth rate of (provincial) GDP in country 2 g(Y2) depends upon relative value of 
(provincial) FDI and domestic investment, on FDI, domestic investment, human capital 
and labour force.  
 
In equation (2.7), the effect of FDI on economic growth is positively associated with the 
level of local human capital in the sense that the higher the level of local human capital 
the higher the impact of FDI on economic growth. 
 
2.3 Growth, FDI and Poverty Reduction in a Simple Model 
 
Regarding model specification, there has been so far no standard framework for modeling 
influences on poverty and poverty reduction. This may be due to the lack of clear 
theoretical guidance on the choice of regressors resulting in a wide set of possible 
specifications. Estimating effects on poverty of influential factors is commonly 
conducted in the following form: 
 
yPct=α0+α1⋅yct+α2⋅Gct+α3⋅`Zct+ηc+γt+ε (2.8) 
(Source: Dollar and Kraay 2001, Ghura et al. 2002, Ravallion and Datt 1999) 
 
where t and c imply, respectively, time and country; yPct and yct are the (natural logarithm 
of) avearge income of the poor and the population, respectively. G denotes the Gini 
coefficient, Zct represents a vector of other determinants of income of the poor, ηc+γt+ε is 
a composite error term consisting of country specific and time specific effects. 
 
In order to examine the changing poverty in terms of poverty measures, Wodon (1999) 
suggested to run the following regression: 
 
logθkt=α0+α1⋅logWkt+α2⋅logGkt+ηc+γt+ε   (2.9) 
   (Wodon, equation (11), p. 12) 
 
where θ denotes the poverty index, W is the mean level of consumption for area k in 
period t. α1 represents gross impact of growth on poverty when Gini coefficients are 
incorporated and net impact when Gini coefficients are excluded. 
 
Though this kind of specification allows estimation of long-term effects of growth and 
inequality on poverty, its limitation is that growth elasticity of poverty was treated 
constant across cross sections. Ravallion (1997, 2001) and Bruno et al. (1996) 
demonstrated that growth elasticity of poverty depended strongly upon the degree of 
initial inequality and the initial level of development. Hence, the distribution corrected 
rate of growth was suggested to be estimated from:  
y
dyGd t ⋅−⋅+= )1(10 ααθ
θ +residual  (2.10) 
(Ravallion, 1997 and 2001) 
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3. FDI in Vietnam and Empirical Results on its Impacts on Local Poverty 
 
3.1 Overview of FDI in Vietnam in the 1990s. 
 
After the issuance of the Law on Foreign Direct Investment in 1987, inward investment 
in Vietnam increased significantly. By the end of 2001, there have been 3802 foreign 
investment projects accounting for USD 41128 million, of which there are 778 
terminated and dissolved projects amounting to USD 8713 million. There are about 3000 
foreign investment projects under operation with registered capital of USD32415 million 
in total. In relative terms, FDI contributes up to 30% of the country’s investment, 10.5% 
of GDP in 1999, 21% of export turnover, creating 300,000 direct jobs (the Vietnam 
Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2000). Among other factors, the rapidly increasing 
FDI since 1988 has been considered an engine of economic growth and a key component 
of the Government industrialization and modernization as well as financing plans (World 
Bank, 1997). So far, FDI has come to almost all the industries that are opened to foreign 
investors and to almost all the provinces of Vietnam. 
 
The reasons for FDI to come to Vietnam include, beside the consistent and sustained 
efforts to reform and the continuously opened and liberalized legal framework 
aforementioned, economic and political stability (Dinh, 2000, p. 5), the normalization of 
relations between Vietnam and the United States, an untouched large market, a 
potentially growing economy, hard and competent workers, low-wage labour costs 
(FIAS, 1999, p. ii). These factors are attractive to both investors aiming at the domestic 
market or at exporting.  
 
Though registered FDI flows increased significantly in the 1990s it displayed a rather 
unstable through time. Registered FDI increased sharply in 1990-1995 in terms of 
number of projects as well as invested capital (Table 3.1, columns (3) and (5)). Then FDI 
inflow to Vietnam declined significantly. This was because of several factors. Firstly, the 
Asian financial crisis since 1997 induced Asian foreign investors who accounted for two 
thirds of FDI to Vietnam (Appendix B) to delay investment activities and/or to withdraw 
from their investment intention. Secondly, foreign investors realised that the reform to 
open up the Vietnamese economy was slower than they expected. There existed many 
difficulties with the administrative mechanism especially after licensing and at the local 
government levels. Facing this fact, efforts of Vietnamese authorities to improve 
investment climate were enhanced significantly. Typically, annual meetings between the 
Prime Minister and foreign investors as well as between Ministries and foreign investors 
have been held in order to solve existing problems; conferences and workshops on the 
way to increase attractiveness and competitiveness for Vietnam’s investment 
environment have also been organized. Since 1999 FDI has shown a signal of 
improvement.  
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Table 3.1: FDI in Vietnam (1988-2001)4 
Number of 
projects 
Registered capital Implemented 
capital as % of 
Year 
No. 
 
 
 
(a) 
Growth 
rate (%) 
USD 
1000 
 
 
(a) 
Growth 
rate (%) 
as % 
of 
GDP 
total 
invest-
ment 
 
(b) 
registered 
capital5 
 
 
(b) 
Size of a 
project 
(1000 
USD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) =(4):(2) 
1988 37 - 366,610 - 1.6 - - 9,908 
1989 69 86.5 580,886 58.5 9.2 - - 8,419 
1990 108 56.6 635,148 9.4 9.8 - - 5,881 
1991 151 39.8 1,274,522 100.7 13.3 - - 8,440 
1992 197 30.5 2,027,407 59.1 20.5 23.8 14.9 10,291 
1993 274 39.1 2,588,879 27.7 20.2 28.7 20.2 9,448 
1994 367 33.9 3,746,033 44.7 24.2 45.6 28.1 10,207 
1995 408 11.2 6,607,543 76. 4 32.7 45.2 38.7 16,195 
1996 365 -10.5 8,640,197 30.8 37.0 40.4 40.1 23,672 
1997 348 -4.7 4,654,119 -46.1 17.7 40.0 37.9 13,374 
1998 275 -20.9 3,896,998 -16.3 14.3 34.8 42.4 14,171 
1999 311 13.1 1,568,040 -59.8 5.5 30.3 44.7 5,042 
2000 374 20.3 2,013,080 28.4 6.4 27.7 48.8 5,383 
2001 518     38.5 2529101 25.63 7.7  53.9 4,882 
Total 3802  41128563      
(Source: (a) MPI, Department of Foreign Investment and Department of Monitoring Foreign Investment 
Projects; (b) own calculations based on data on total investment of the Vietnamese General Statistics Office 
and data on exchange rate in International Financial Statistics: Yearbooks 1994-2001, IMF). 
 
As shown in column (9), the size of projects increased up to 1998 despite the significant 
decline in FDI inflows since 1996. Hence, though the 1996-1998 period marked an 
unsuccessful duration in attracting FDI, it was the time big projects came to Vietnam 
implying that Vietnamese environment was still attractive from long-term consideration. 
Since 1999, the size of investment projects has declined because of the widened 
authorization to the Management Board of Industrial Zones and Export Processing Zones 
in giving investment license to small projects. With regard to implementation of FDI, 
disbursed capital as percentage of registered capital (column (8)) reflects that the 
implementation is not so poor, compared with the ratio of 36% in China and 31% in the 
Philippines in the initial 10 years of attracting FDI (Tran, 1999). This may lessen the 
widely reporting criticisms that implementation of FDI in Vietnam is really difficult. 
 
 
                                                           
4 FDI inflows to Vietnam began in 1988 after the Law on Foreign Investment was launched in December 
1987. For the time period 1988-1990, only registered capital was recorded. Since 1991, implemented 
capital has been monitored. Hence implemented capital in 1991 is the cumulative implemented capital in 
the time period 1988-1991.  
5 Implemented FDI as percentage of registered FDI here is calculated by dividing stock values of 
implemented FDI by stock values of registered FDI at the end of the year. 
 13 
FDI by Province 
 
Recent FDI in Vietnam has diversified to all the provinces. In terms of registered 
investment, all the 61 provinces of Vietnam host foreign investment projects at the end of 
2001 (Appendix A). This result is largely because the Vietnam's Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) in compliance with the Vietnamese State’s commitment on eradication 
of poverty by 2010, increasingly encourages FDI to come to poor, remote and hard up 
areas. The incentives provided to foreign investors are basically tax incentives. Recently, 
a list of promoted areas (including poor and remote ones) is issued formally in the Decree 
24/2000/ND-CP that guides the implementation of the Foreign Investment Law. More 
strongly, in some special cases like oil refinery investment, the Vietnamese Government 
stipulated the location of foreign investment activities in order to develop the local areas.  
 
Therefore, the distribution of registered, or approved, FDI in Vietnam becomes less 
uneven in 2001 than that in 1995 (Figure 3.1). Though registered FDI continues going 
strongly to the SouthEast region, the share of accumulated FDI of the SouthEast in total 
accumulated FDI of the whole country reduced considerably from 79.4% in 1995 to 
54.3% in 2001. Meanwhile, the shares of accumulated FDI of the other regions all 
increased. Typically, the share of the South Central Coast tripled from 2.3% to 7.6%, the 
share of the Red River Delta doubled from 13% to 26.5%. 
 
Figure 3.1: Shares of Accumulated Values of Registered FDI in Regions of Vietnam 
 
(Source: MPI, Department for Foreign Investment) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the distribution of FDI among regions and provinces of Vietnam remains 
rather uneven. This holds for both registered FDI (Figure 3.1) and implemented FDI 
(Figure 3.2). Most of the foreign investment projects still concentrate on provinces in the 
SouthEast region and the Red River Delta like HoChiMinhCity, Hanoi, Dong-nai, Binh-
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duong, Baria-Vungtau where infrastructure is in good condition. Investment in poor, 
remote and hard up areas like the North Mountain and Midlands, Central Highlands, 
North Central Coast remains sparse despite the economic potential of these regions. 
Practically, the Central Highlands are endowed with different industrial trees like coffee, 
tea, pepper, rubber while rice, tropical agricultural and aquatic products come mainly 
from the Mekong River Delta. Hence developing these areas also means developing the 
input base for sustained growth of other richer regions. In terms of percentage of total 
investment projects, projects in areas with difficult and especially difficult socio-
economic conditions account for just about 20%. This may imply that offering tax 
incentives without other supportive measures, say investing in infrastructure, may not be 
sufficient to attract foreign investors. 
 
Figure 3.2: Shares of Accumulated Implemented FDI in Vietnam to the End of 2001 
by Region  
 
(Source: MPI, Department for Monitoring Foreign Investment Projects) 
 
Moreover, the implementation of foreign invested projects in the poor areas seems to be  
worse than that in the rest. Implemented FDI by the end of 2001 (Figure 3.2) skews more 
towards the SouthEast region than approved FDI at that time (Figure 3.1). This implies 
that the diversification of approved FDI among regions and provinces of Vietnam is not 
well realised in practice. The poor provinces tend to have a lower rate of FDI 
implementation and a higher share of terminated and dissolved foreign projects than other 
provinces. Typically, the rates of FDI implementation in the Central Highlands and the 
South Central Coast are 15.3% and 35.4%, respectively (Figure 3.3) which are rather low 
compared with that of the other regions or with the average level of the whole country 
(57.4%). Meanwhile, the terminated and dissolved foreign projects in these regions (4.4% 
and 11.9%, respectively) account for a greater share in implemented FDI than that in the 
other regions or the country as a whole (3.3%). These illustrate the fragility of FDI 
activities there. The North Mountain and Midland has a slightly small rate of FDI 
termination and dissolvement (2.9%) but FDI’s implementation (47.5%) is poorer than 
the country on average. Similarly, while the implementation rate in the Mekong River 
South Central Coast
(5%)
North Central Coast
(3%)
South East 
(62%)
North Mountain and 
Midland
(4%)
Central Highlands
(1%)
Red River Delta 
(21%)
Mekong River Delta 
(4%)
 15 
Delta (88.8%) is far higher than the national level, the ratio of FDI termination and 
dissolvement (5.9%) is also higher than the national level. These all illustrate practical 
difficulties in promoting FDI into poor areas. Hence FDI’s direct impact on poverty 
reduction in Vietnam might be limited. Its considerable impact may work through its 
impact on economic growth. 
 
Figure 3.3: Implementation of FDI in Regions of Vietnam 
 
(Source: as Table 3.2) 
 
Theoretically, Industrial Zones (IZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) can be a 
measure to help overcome drawbacks of poor infrastructure of some regions in attracting 
FDI. Nevertheless, this has been criticised not to be exploited very well in Vietnam. Early 
in 1991, the Vietnamese government approved the operation of IZs and EPZs and since 
then the authorities have advocated IZs, EPZs in hard up provinces in order to promote 
development there. There have been 61 IZs and EPZs approved so far but the number of 
built zones is smaller since the implementation of projects that build IZs and EPZs is 
slow. In addition, most of these zones are located in more developed areas: 15 zones in 
the North (mainly in Hanoi and Hai-phong), 8 zones in the Central Region and 38 zones 
in the South (mostly in HoChiMinh City, Dong-nai, Binh-duong). Furthermore, the 
operation of these zones is an issue. Though investing in IZs and EPZs are encouraged, 
through simple administrative procedures, tax incentives, renting areas in built zones 
account for a relatively small share in total areas of builted zones, especially in hard up 
provinces. Hence, FDI’s impact on poverty through IZs, EPZs seems to be limited. 
 
Given the characteristics of FDI to Vietnam in the 1990s, whether FDI really contributed 
to the country’s growth and whether it benefited the poor will be examined quantitatively 
in the next sub-sections.   
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3.2 Impacts of FDI on Economic Growth of Vietnamese Provinces 
 
On the basis of the framework of the leader-follower model aforementioned and 
following Borenzstein et al. (1995, 1998), the tested model is specified as follows:  
 
   git=α+β⋅Pubinvestit+ϕ⋅FDIit+ψ⋅Hit+φ⋅(FDIit⋅Hit)+ν⋅GLit+θ⋅S+γ⋅DVRit+εit  (3.1) 
 
where g is the annual growth rate of provincial GDP measured at constant 1994 prices, 
Pubinvest and FDI denote domestic public investment and foreign direct investment, 
respectively. H is human capital stock, and GL measures the annual growth rate of labour 
force. S represents a set of other variables that affect economic growth. DVR is the 
regional dummy variable that captures different natural conditions in different regions of 
Vietnam. The subscripts i and t denote province and time, respectively. εit is the random 
error term. It is assumed to be randomly and independently distributed with 
E[εi]=E[εt]=0, var(εit)=σ2ε, cov(εit, εit-k)=0 if k≠0 and cov(εit, εjt)=0 if i≠j, cov(Xit, εit)=0 
with X as regressors. 
 
The group of variables S consists of inflation and population growth. In the follower-
leader model mentioned above, prices are supposed to be unchanged. However, prices do 
change in practice and the change in prices makes the marginal product of capital, m2j, in 
(2.2) decline thereby affecting the discount rate, r, in (2.6) and economic growth in (2.7). 
Likewise, population growth is put aside in the follower-leader model. Nevertheless, 
population growth affects human capital formation and participation of labourers 
especially females and affects the rate of time preference, ρ, thereby influencing growth 
in (2.7).  
 
In the above model, the desirable variable for domestic capacity of production must be 
gross domestic (public and private) investment rather than domestic public investment. 
Nevertheless, the quality of data on private investment in Vietnam is very poor. Using 
these data may give a misleading result. Hence, only public investment is incorporated.   
 
Specifications of Pubinvest and FDI are rather similar. According to Ward (1976), the 
flow of (domestic and foreign) capital service should be the most appropriate in 
explaining economic growth and examining the roles of capital and labour in production 
in different industries of the economy. Since the dependent variable is specified as the 
provincial growth rate, investment should be entered as percentages of provincial GDP 
(Lipsey, 2000). This gives the same regressors as those in the standard equation of 
growth accounting. In addition, since both Pubinvest and FDI can be highly influenced 
by economic growth, these variables are instrumented by their lagged values in order to 
avoid simultaneity. Basing on the background of investment projects in Vietnam, FDI 
and Pubinvest lagged by 2 years are chosen. 
 
Since the main objective is to explore the impact of FDI on economic growth at the 
national level, the pooled regression rather than fixed effects ones is exerted. This is 
because the time dimension of the panel is much smaller than the space dimension. 
Capturing province specific effects in this case will cause a great loss in degrees of 
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freedom that in turn may alter the impact of FDI. Hence following the parsimony 
principle in econometric modeling (Gurajati, 1992) a pooled regression is employed.  
 
In estimating, cross section weighting is used to correct for between section 
heteroskedasticity and White Covariance Estimation is employed to correct for within 
section heteroskedasticity.  
 
Model (3.1) is first tested with the 1996-2000 period when data for all the variables are 
available. The regression outcomes are introduced in Table 3.2. FDI exerts positive 
impacts on Vietnamese economic growth in the 1996-2000 period and the impacts are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Human capital and growth of labour force also 
help raise economic growth. These impacts are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Meanwhile, inflation, which is measured by GDP deflator, exerts a significantly negative 
influence on growth. Public investment and population growth have insignificant impacts 
on provincial growth. This may be due to the fact that the time frame is too short so that 
the effects may not be realised.  
 
Empirically, there is no considerable effect of terminated and outdated FDI on 
implemented FDI flows during the time of Asian financial crisis. Regression (3.2.1) 
differs from regressions (3.2.2)-(3.2.5) in that ImplFDI in (3.2.1) is measured by annually 
implemented FDI while NetFDI in (3.2.2)-(3.2.5) is measured by annually implemented 
FDI after subtracting implemented values of outdated or terminated FDI projects in the 
corresponding year. Hence NetFDI gives a more appropriate measure of FDI when 
assessing impacts on growth and should therefore be the main factor under analysis in 
this paper. The use of ImplFDI in the model is just to compare if the estimation results 
differ significantly from the use of NetFDI. Empirically, ImplFDI in (3.2.1) has a slightly 
smaller impact on provincial economic growth than that of NetFDI in (3.2.2). In general, 
there is no considerable difference between the estimates in (3.2.1) and (3.2.2). Hence, 
terminated and dissolved FDI in the 1996-2000 period does not play a significant role in 
affecting the net FDI inflow to Vietnam.  
 
In the regressions (3.2.3) and (3.2.5), the estimated coefficients on the Interaction 
variable are positive and significant at the 1% level. This implies that there exist 
interactions between FDI and local human capital in Vietnam during 1996-2000 in the 
way that the higher the level of provincial human capital, the higher the impact of FDI on 
provincial economic growth. Therefore, the GoV may increase benefits of FDI to the 
economy through policies that promote education and training. 
 
Given the positive effect of FDI on growth and the positive interactions between FDI and 
human capital, human capital in Vietnam seems to exceed the threshold level above 
which countries can benefit from FDI (Borenzstein et al. 1995, 1998). The positive 
interaction between FDI and local human capital in Vietnam during 1996-2000 can be 
partly due to the fact that technology brought in by foreign investors is more modern than 
that used in Vietnamese enterprises (Nguyen, Trong Xuan 2001, p. 101; Bui, Anh Tuan 
2000, p. 63). The higher the level of local human capital the higher the production 
efficiency then. This is also reflected in labour and employment fairs in 2002 in some 
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provinces, where demands for skilled workers were not fully met. Typically, in Dong-Nai  
province foreign investors intended to recruit 7,000 skilled workers but could find only 
3,000 ones6.  
 
Table 3.2: Effects of FDI on Provincial Economic Growth (1996-2000) 
(pooled regressions) 
Regression number Explanatory variable 
(3.2.1) (3.2.2) (3.2.3) (3.2.4) (3.2.5) 
Pubinvest          0.019 
        (1.560) 
    0.020 
   (1.630) 
      0.017 
     (1.379) 
     0.0196 
    (1.634) 
    0.017 
   (1.418) 
ImplFDI          0.034*** 
        (6.639) 
    
NetFDI       0.036*** 
    (6.639) 
    -0.069** 
   (-2.499) 
     0.036*** 
    (6.625) 
   -0.069** 
  (-2.524) 
H         0.254** 
        (2.496) 
     0.262** 
    (2.594) 
      0.186* 
     (1.844) 
     0.263*** 
    (2.620) 
     0.186* 
    (1.844) 
GL          0.044** 
        (2.581) 
     0.043** 
    (2.556) 
      0.052*** 
     (2.997) 
     0.043** 
    (2.564) 
     0.051*** 
    (2.972) 
Interaction  
(FDI*H) 
        0.017*** 
    (4.164) 
      0.017*** 
    (4.215) 
Inflation        -0.113*** 
      (-5.295) 
    -0.110*** 
   (-5.184) 
    -0.107*** 
   (-4.818) 
    -0.110*** 
  (-5.192) 
    -0.108*** 
  (-4.832) 
Population growth        -1.056 
      (-0.132) 
    -0.991 
   (-0.124) 
    -0.035 
   (-0.005) 
  
DV Region1        -1.397*** 
      (-2.979) 
    -1.395*** 
   (-2.931) 
    -1.384*** 
   (-2.695) 
    -1.382*** 
   (-3.014) 
    -1.396*** 
   (-2.741) 
DV Region2        -2.514*** 
      (-6.680) 
    -2.539*** 
  (-6.597) 
    -2.698*** 
   (-5.966) 
    -2.529*** 
   (-6.653) 
    -2.704*** 
   (-5.979) 
DV Region 3        -2.723*** 
      (-5.376) 
    -2.725*** 
   (-5.325) 
    -2.653*** 
  (-4.805) 
    -2.710*** 
   (-5.514) 
    -2.661*** 
   (-4.933) 
DV Region 4        -1.152*** 
     (-2.724) 
    -1.122** 
   (-2.588) 
    -1.144** 
   (-2.384) 
    -1.112*** 
   (-2.627) 
    -1.151** 
   (-2.400) 
DV Region 5         2.368** 
       (2.184) 
      2.383** 
    (2.185) 
      2.296** 
     (2.015) 
     2.356** 
    (2.201) 
    2.293** 
   (2.082) 
DV Region 7        -1.966*** 
      (-3.950) 
    -1.935*** 
  (-3.830) 
    -2.021*** 
   (-3.851) 
    -1.920*** 
   (-3.935) 
   -2.031*** 
  (-3.857) 
Adjusted R2         0.851     0.848       0.827      0.849      0.827 
Durbin-Watson statistic        1.787      1.791       1.827      1.791      1.828 
Number of observations    212  212   212  212  212 
Notes: ***, **, * represents the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. t-statistics are in the 
parentheses. Estimated intercepts are not shown in the table. H is the average number of schooling years of 
provincial workers. 
 
The positive interaction of FDI and local human capital in affecting growth may also  
work through labour turnover and spillover. If there exist labour turnover and spillover, 
the higher the level of human capital the greater the technology diffusion from FIEs. 
Labour turnover, especially at the management level, may be considerably in some 
                                                           
6 Information released by Mr. Vo Minh Quang, Director of the Department for Labour, Invalids and Social 
Affairs of Dong-Nai Province, Vietnam. 
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industries in Vietnam like production of animal foods7 where production does not require 
very high technology and selling products entails knowledge about customers. After 
some years working in FIEs, Vietnamese workers may learn the way to produce, get in 
touch with customers and they can establish their own business when they leave FIEs. In 
my survey in 2001 which covered 26 foreign investors in Vietnam, labour turnover was 
confirmed by foreign investors in the auditing, automobile production and textile sectors. 
It is also affirmed in Bui’s survey of 102 Vietnamese workers in FIEs. According to his 
results, only 32.4% of interviewees wanted to continue working in FIEs while 31.4% 
intended to move to state-own enterprises and 22.5% planned to established their own 
business (Bui, Anh Tuan 2000, p. 98). As such, labour turnover may be of considerable 
significance in Vietnam. The higher the human capital the greater the technology diffused 
through labour turnover and the greater the total impact of FDI on growth.  
 
Another channel for FDI and human capital interacting positively in affecting growth 
may be through spillover or demonstration effect in particular. Empirically, there exist 
significantly positive spillover from FIEs in manufacturing to Vietnamese counterparts 
on the basis of data in Enterprise Censuses in 1995, 1998 and 2001 conducted by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (my forthcoming paper). Moreover, the spillover is 
estimated to be stronger than that in other countries. Qualitatively, there were complaints 
of foreign investors in that Vietnamese investors illegally imitated the style of FIEs’ 
products8. Hence, the high level of local human capital may help increase the total factor 
of productivity of local enterprises. 
 
Since economic growth and FDI increase occurred significantly in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, model (3.1) is tried with the period 1990-2000. As the Asian financial crisis 
occurred in the second half of this time period, a dummy variable, DV, that represents 
impact of the Asian financial crisis on growth is included in the model as follows:  
 
git=α+β⋅Pubinvestit+ϕ⋅FDIit+ψ⋅Hit+φ⋅(FDIit⋅Hit)+ν⋅GLit+θ⋅S+γ⋅DVRit+DVt+εit (3.2) 
 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.3. Public investment has a positive and 
significant impact at the 1% level on provincial growth in all specifications. FDI also 
have positive and significant effects, be it ImplFDI or NetFDI. NetFDI has a slightly 
smaller effect on provincial growth than ImplFDI. However, the results of using ImplFDI 
(in (3.3.1)) and NetFDI (in (3.3.2)) are similar to each other. This affirms that in the 
longer period 1990-2000 terminated and outdated values of implemented FDI projects are 
insignificant compared with total implemented values of FDI projects.  
The estimates for the period 1990-2000 are similar to that for the 1996-2000 period. FDI 
and human capital in the 1990-2000 period interacts positively in affecting economic 
growth and the interaction is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
                                                           
7 Comment by Mr. Pham Hoang Ha, Researcher of the Department for Research on Macroeconomic 
Policy, Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM), Hanoi, Vietnam. 
8 Complaints of Mr. Nak Kil Sung, General Director of LG-MECA Electronics Inc.; Mr. Takeshi Ohara, 
General Director of Everton (Vietnam) Co., Ltd.; Mr. David Chen, Vice General Director, Vietnam Caesar 
Sanitary Wares Co., Ltd. 
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Table 3.3: FDI’s Impact on Provincial Economic Growth (1990-2000) 
(pooled regressions) 
Regression number Explanatory variable 
(3.3.1) (3.3.2) (3.3.3) (3.3.4) (3.3.5) 
Pubinvest          0.046*** 
        (3.532) 
    0.046*** 
   (3.462) 
      0.045*** 
     (3.377) 
     0.048*** 
    (3.648) 
    0.047*** 
   (3.542) 
ImplFDI          0.070*** 
        (6.731) 
    
NetFDI       0.063*** 
    (6.310) 
    -0.019 
   (-0.640) 
     0.063*** 
    (6.279) 
    -0.027 
   (-1.033) 
H         0.155 
        (1.554) 
     0.169* 
    (1.696) 
      0.115 
     (1.125) 
     0.177* 
    (1.784) 
     0.118 
    (1.161) 
GL          0.033** 
        (1.015) 
     0.029 
    (0.877) 
      0.030 
     (0.885) 
     0.020 
    (0.897) 
     0.025 
    (1.139) 
Interaction  
(FDI*H) 
        0.013*** 
    (3.264) 
      0.014*** 
    (4.085) 
Inflation        -0.010*** 
      (-3.513) 
    -0.010*** 
   (-3.832) 
    -0.010*** 
   (-3.770) 
    -0.010*** 
   (-3.639) 
    -0.010*** 
   (-3.665) 
Population growth        -6.612 
      (-0.625) 
    -6.249 
   (-0.531) 
    -4.577 
   (-0.393) 
  
DV Region1        -1.781*** 
      (-4.561) 
    -1.939*** 
  (-4.748) 
    -2.056*** 
   (-4.786) 
    -1.925*** 
  (-4.618) 
    -2.065*** 
  (-4.753) 
DV Region2        -2.34*** 
      (-5.651) 
    -2.450*** 
  (-5.878) 
   -2.729*** 
  (-6.256) 
    -2.335*** 
   (-5.341) 
    -2.653*** 
   (-5.789) 
DV Region 3        -2.224*** 
      (-4.643) 
    -2.397*** 
   (-4.906) 
   -2.434*** 
  (-4.848) 
    -2.330*** 
  (-4.618) 
    -2.391*** 
  (-4.626) 
DV Region 4        -0.972** 
     (-2.541) 
    -1.083** 
   (-2.754) 
   -1.191** 
  (-2.895) 
    -1.009** 
   (-2.438) 
    -1.148*** 
  (-2.669) 
DV Region 5         0.841** 
       (0.787) 
      0.692 
    (0.641) 
    0.530 
   (0.474) 
     0.613 
    (0.588) 
     0.456** 
    (0.423) 
DV Region 7        -1.958*** 
      (-4.395) 
    -2.080*** 
  (-4.628) 
    -2.223*** 
  (-4.779) 
    -1.954*** 
   (-4.169) 
    -2.143*** 
  (-4.420) 
DV       -1.382*** 
    (-7.867) 
    -1.344*** 
  (-7.621) 
    -1.267*** 
  (-7.008) 
    -1.330*** 
  (-7.868) 
    -1.255*** 
  (-7.323) 
Adjusted R2         0.770     0.775       0.766      0.777      0.771 
Durbin-Watson statistic        1.588      1.592       1.605      1.600      1.616 
Number of observations    396  396   396  396  396 
Note: estimated intercepts are not reported in the table. Other points are similar to that in Notes in Table 
5.2. 
 
3.3 Impacts of Economic Growth and FDI on Poverty Reduction in Vietnamese Provinces 
 
Given the positive effect of FDI on economic growth in Vietnamese provinces, and given 
the theoretical and empirical arguments on growth’s impact on poverty, the concern now 
is to what extent poverty reduction in Vietnam is affected by economic growth and  by 
FDI directly. 
 
Following Ravallion (1997), the tested model is specified as follows:  
i
i
i
i
i
y
dy
G
d
).1.( 96,10 −+= ααθ
θ
+Gi,96+residual 
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where 
i
id
θ
θ
 is the percentage of the change in the head-count index of province i of 
Vietnam in 2000 compared with that in 1996. Gi,96 denotes the Gini coefficient of 
province i of Vietnam in 1996. 
i
i
y
dy
 measures the percentage of the change in GDP of 
province i in 2000 (measured in 1994 prices) compared with that in 1996 (measured in 
1994 prices also). The reason for choosing the 1996-2000 period is because data on 
poverty before 1996 are not available for all Vietnamese provinces and a new poverty 
line has been applied since 2001 making data on poverty in 2001 incompatible with that 
in previous years.  
 
Estimated results are presented in Table 3.4. In (3.4.1), real growth of provincial GDP 
has a negative effect on the rate of poverty change. As economic growth increases by 1%, 
the headcount index will decline by 0.835%, other things being the same. The impact is 
significant at the 10% level. Inequality at the beginning of the period under consideration 
affects positively but insignificantly poverty reduction. Hence, it can be said that 
inequality in 1996 in Vietnam has no role in explaining results of poverty reduction in the 
period 1996-2000.  
 
Table 3.4: Impacts on Poverty Reduction in Vietnamese Provinces (1996-2000) 
Regression number Explanatory 
variable (3.4.1) (3.4.2) (3.4.3) (3.4.4) (3.4.5) 
Rgrowth9600     -0.835* 
    (0.429) 
 -0.677* 
 (0.380) 
 -0.762** 
 (0.358) 
 -0.728* 
 (0.380) 
 -0.709* 
 (0.385) 
Poverty96   -1.075***   
(0.283) 
 -1.024*** 
 (0.272) 
 -1.047*** 
 (0.286) 
 -1.017*** 
 (0.293) 
Qualilabour   -2.638*** 
 (0.761) 
 -2.505*** 
 (0.733) 
 -2.444*** 
 (0.771) 
 -2.398*** 
 (0.781) 
Gini96     -0.569 
    (0.793) 
  0.496 
 (0.731) 
   
FDI9700     -0.0026 
 (0.0096) 
 -0.0026 
 (0.0096) 
Hepr      -0.205 
 (0.387) 
Adjusted R2      0.029   0.262    0.269   0.257   0.247 
Number of 
observations 
    61   61   61  61  61 
 
One deficiency of (3.4.1) is that adjusted R2 is very low, implying that some influential 
factors, except growth and initial inequality, might not be incorporated. As a matter of 
fact, the rate of poverty reduction in Vietnam in the 1996-2000 period may depend 
considerably on the poverty level at the beginning of the period under consideration. This 
is because the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) program of the GoV 
has been targeted at the poor, and funds and banks‘ credits have been allocated to the 
provinces following their severity of poverty. In addition to the initial poverty state, local 
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human capital may be another factor of relevance. One explanation may be that the 
higher the level of human capital, the higher the possibility that local people can 
participate in a growing economy.   
 
Inclusion of these two variables into regression gives results in (3.4.2)-(3.4.5). Both the 
provincial poverty in 1996 and qualified labour force of Vietnamese provinces exert 
siginificantly negative impacts (at the 1%) on the rate of change in poverty. Real 
economic growth during 1996-2000 period still exerts negative and significant impact (at 
the 10% level) on the rate of poverty change. The higher the economic growth, the faster 
poverty is reduced. 
 
As FDI has positive effects on provincial growth and growth in turn helps reduce 
poverty, FDI in Vietnam in the 1996-2000 period indirectly reduces local poverty. In 
order to examine total FDI‘s impact on poverty, FDI, measured by implemented FDI per 
worker in 1997-2000, is included in the model as a regressor. The coefficient on FDI then 
represents FDI‘s direct impact on poverty, over and above growth‘s impact. The result is 
given in regression (3.4.4) where FDI is estimated to raise the magnitude of poverty 
reduction in the 1996-2000 period. The estimated impact is, however, insignificant even 
at the 10% level.  
 
The estimated negative direct effect of FDI on poverty may come from different 
channels. Firstly, FDI in Vietnam as stipulated by the Foreign Investment Law is green-
field investment, hence  379,000 employments in FIEs (to the end of 2001) are basically 
newly created. Many skilled workers who were poor in the closed regime before 1986 
and children of poor households in the closed regime have found jobs in FIEs and their 
incomes help their families overcome poverty directly. Secondly, FIEs may create a large 
number of indirect employment in forwardly linked entities (Bui, 2000, pp. 71-72). 
According to my survey of 26 foreign investors, most FIEs used Vietnamese services for 
selling, advertising, marketing. Thirdly, FDI in Vietnam has diversified to almost all the 
provinces of the country thereby contributing directly to the local development process. 
This is illustrated well with some big investment projects in remote areas like Morning 
Star Cement Co., Ltd., in Kien-Giang province; Phu-My-Hung Corp. in the South of Ho-
Chi-Minh City. Morning Star Cement Co., Ltd. is a big joint venture between 
Switzerland’s Holderbank Financiere Glaris Ltd. and Ha Tien 1 Cement Company of 
Vietnam. The 5.6 squared km site where the joint venture is located was very swampy 
and deserted before but was re-filled; and local roads, a local port and a power plant were 
built making the area become crowded recently. Similarly, Phu-My-Hung Corp. is 
conducting a project of building a new city center in the south of Ho-Chi-Minh City that 
was very deserted and swampy in the past. In terms of registered investment, all the 61 
provinces of Vietnam host foreign investment at the end of 2001 (Appendix A).  
 
Given this practically positive direct impact of FDI on local poverty, this impact might be 
small on average and the coefficient on the FDI variable in (3.4.4) is thus estimated to be 
insignificant. Regarding direct employment, workers in FIEs account for only 0.99% of 
the labour force. Hence, FIEs are not a main actor in attracting local workers. In addion, 
the number of indirect employment seems small since the linkage between FIEs and 
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backwardly linked enterprises remains rather weak. Practically, a large part of FIEs‘ 
inputs come from imports resulting in a limited number of employees in backwardly 
linked entities. According to my surveys of 26 foreign investors in different industries in 
2001, up to 80-90% of FIEs‘ inputs come from imports. The reason is because there is no 
domestic supply of FIEs‘ inputs, and if there is, quantity and quality of supply do not 
meet FIEs‘ criteria. With regard to horizontally indirect employment, FDI‘s impacts are 
more complicated and not really clear-cut. In some industries, say production of soft 
drinks, detergents, cosmetics, FIEs successfully outcompeted Vietnamese enterprises9. 
This may partly be due to intensive marketing programs of FIEs that make domestic 
counterparts unable to compete. In other industries, say textile, footwear production, food 
processing, FDI may have positive effects in the sense that it puts competitive pressures 
on domestic enterprises and displays a model from that domestic enterprises can learn. 
But given the feature of the Vietnamese economy that private enterprises are still 
discriminated compared with state-owned enterprises, the horizontally indirect impact of 
FDI may not be considerable and FDI‘s impact on poverty reduction may thus be 
insignificant as estimated.  
 
Regarding FDI’s distribution across Vietnamese provinces, most of the foreign 
investment projects still concentrate on provinces in the SouthEast and Red River Delta 
like Ho-Chi-Minh City, Hanoi, Dong-nai, Binh-duong, Baria-Vungtau where 
infrastructure is in good condition. Investment in poor, remote and hard up areas like the 
North Mountain and Midlands, Central Highlands, North Central Coast remains sparse 
despite the economic potential of these regions. Recent literature suggests that Industrial 
Zones (IZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) may be a measure to overcome 
drawbacks of poor infrastructure of some regions in attracting FDI, this has not been 
exploited very well in Vietnam. Most of these zones are located in more developed areas: 
15 zones in the North (mainly in Hanoi and Hai-phong), 8 zones in the Central Region 
and 38 zones in the South (mostly in HoChiMinh City, Dong-nai, Binh-duong). 
Furthermore, the operation of these zones remains rather poor, the rate of renting areas in 
built zones is relatively low especially in hard up provinces.  
 
These all demonstrate that FDI’s direct impact on poverty reduction in Vietnam seems 
limited.  
 
Regarding indirect impact of FDI on poverty through its contribution to the host‘s budget, 
this influence may be negligible. Contributions of FIEs to the host budget include 
contributions to the provincial budget and to the state budget. According to the 
Vietnamese Law on Budget, FIEs contribute a part of their taxes on repatriated profits, on 
profits, personnal income, natural resource usage and all their import and export taxes to 
the state budget. This contribution which is presented in Table 3.5 is increasing over time 
but remains small. This is partly because many foreign investment projects are still in the 
time of tax holidays and partly because many FIEs are suffering losses. The latter is 
largely due to an increasingly prominent fact of ‘over pricing‘ of technology transferred 
from parents to FIEs in Vietnam (Manh Hung, 2001).  FIEs contribute the rest of their 
                                                           
9Comment of Mr. Tran Du Lich, Director of the Institute for Economics, Ho-Chi-Minh City, Vietnam 
(Interview in July 2002). 
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taxes on repatriated profits, on profits, personnal income, natural resource usage to the 
provincial budget. In addition, FIEs may participate in local charity programs and donate 
funds to the local budget. In some provinces where many foreign investment projects 
concentrate like Dong-Nai, Binh-Duong FIEs participate considerably in local programs 
on poverty reduction through charity contribution. To examine if this local spending has 
any effect on poverty, provincial spendings on poverty reduction which are measured by 
per worker spendings on poverty in 1997-2000 from provincial budgets are included in 
the model. Estimated results are shown in (3.4.5). Local spendings on poverty helps 
reduce poverty but this impact is statistically insignificant even at the 10%.  
 
Table 3. 5: Foreign Invested Enterprises‘ Contribution to the State Budget 
FIEs‘ 
contribution 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
in Mill. USD  128 195 263 315 317 271 280 373 
in % of total 
budget revenue 
1.5 2.8 4.2 5.1 6.2 6.3 5.5 6.2 6.4 
(Source: General Department for Taxation, Vietnam) 
 
Similarly, FDI‘s effect on local poverty through affecting public investment may be 
rather weak. In my surveys, most foreign investors said that they had not required the 
GoV to invest in infrastructures of the place where they intended to invest in. The reasons 
were that some foreign investors worked in industrial zones so local infrastructures were 
in good conditions; other foreign investors thought that the local authorities might not 
help and if there was a help necessary procedures would be very complicated and time 
consuming. Only one foreign investor10 said that he made request to the local government 
to improve local infrastructures but the response did not satisfy him. 
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
In short, FDI in Vietnam contributes significantly to economic growth and economic 
growth is an influential factor of poverty reduction of the country. The direct impact of 
FDI on poverty is however insignificant. Therefore, in general, integration into the world 
economy through FDI, benefits the poor in Vietnam. The question raised is how to 
increase FDI‘s contributions and through which channels this promotion can be 
implemented. 
 
Regarding the direct impact of FDI on poverty, it may be affected through policies that 
continue promoting FDI into high-technology industries as well as labour-intensive 
industries. This is because countries that have just opened usually want to concentrate 
and give priorities to high technology industries in the hope of developing rapidly. 
Therefore, traditional sectors might be neglected and this may quite possibly lead to 
poverty increase. In addition, policies that encourage development of related industries 
rather than local content requirements may be a suitable measure to get a strong linkage 
between FIEs and domestic counterparts. This may be quite relevant to Vietnam since the 
local content requirements have been met poorly in practice, basically due to the weak 
                                                           
10 Mr. Nak Kil Sung, General Director of MECA Electronics Inc. 
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capability of the Vietnamese enterprises. There exist many obstacles, typically in credit, 
to private enterprises so that they become unable to develop fully and get in touch with 
FIEs.  
 
Relating to FDI‘s distribution and the way to affect it in order to make FDI work more 
for the poor, a test of determinants of FDI‘s distribution across Vietnamese provinces 
which is similar to that of Broadman and Sun (1997), Chen Chunlai (1997), Klingspor et 
al. (1999) is conducted. Given the generous tax policy applied to FIEs working in poor 
and remote areas, the fact that few FIEs working there implies that this policy must  
practically be ineffective. Hence it is not taken into account here. The estimation results 
are shown in Table 4.1 where the market size (represented by provincial GDP), technical 
workers and industrial zones are the most important determinants of distribution of both 
registered and implemented FDI. Electricity and economic development (measured by 
GDPPC) are significant in influencing implemented FDI but not registered FDI. Road 
density on the contrary does not have any significant impact on FDI‘s distribution. 
Therefore, in order to motivate FDI to come to poor and remote areas, appropriate 
policies include enhancing human capital of local workers, upgrading electricity supply 
in terms of quantity and quality and building industrial zones.  
 
Table 4.1: Determinants of FDI‘s Distribution across Provinces of Vietnam 
Explanatory 
variable 
Regression (4.1.1) 
Dependent variable: AccRegFDI 
Regresion (4.1.2) 
Dependent variable:  
AccImpFDI 
GDP 0.121*** 
              (0.022) 
0.019** 
               (0.009) 
GDPPC               -0.745** 
              (0.322) 
1.060*** 
               (0.137) 
Humancapital 76180*** 
              (13270) 
15727*** 
              (5659) 
Roaddensity                   4501 
                 (78126) 
                -8812 
(33312) 
Electricity                -0.535 
               (0.670) 
0.499* 
(0.286) 
Industrialzone                 211851*** 
               (48530) 
    92559*** 
(20693) 
Adjusted R2 0.935 0.959 
Number of 
observations 
61 61 
Notes: estimated intercepts are not reported in the Table; AccImpFDI and AccRegFDI are accumulated 
values of implemented and registered FDI to December 31, 2000, respectively. GDP denotes GDP of 
provinces of Vietnam in 1998. GDPPC represents provincial GDP per capita in 1998. Humancapital is 
measured by the percentage of skilled workers having certificates in total labour force. Electricity 
represents electricity supplied in 1998 for business and management activities of Vietnamese provinces. 
Roaddensity is measured by the length of asphalted roads in each province in 1998, normalized by the area 
of the corresponding province. Industrialzone means the number of industrial zones in each province in 
1998. 
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Regarding FDI‘s indirect impact on poverty through economic growth, policies to be 
followed can be ones that help attract FDI into Vietnam, policies that raise 
implementation of registered foreign investment projects and policies that motivate 
upgrading local human capital. Policies to attract FDI into Vietnam within the current 
context of increasing regionalisation and globalisation must take into account the 
competition of neighbours which have many features similar to Vietnam. This might be 
overcome through measures that improve the domestic competitive environment. In this 
regard, a specification of the sequence of openning the economy may be of great 
importance. Allowing FDI to come into different sectors and under different forms, say, 
merge and acquisition of moribund state-owned enterprises, may benefit the country. A  
level playing field together with officials‘ activities to introduce and invite foreign 
investors to come may then be quite useful. 
 
Regarding policies that can help raising implemented FDI, measures to improve the 
administrative and management environment seem to be the most important. These 
include establishing a consistent and stable legal system that regulates FIEs‘ activities 
and simplifying administrative procedures. There have been many improvements made 
by efforts of the GoV in order to facilitate FIEs‘ operations (e.g., abolishment of duel 
pricing policies that discriminated against foreign investors and making laws and policies 
more transparent). However, bureaucratic red tape remains extensive and this enhances 
corruption and discourages investors. The periodical meetings between foreign investors 
and officials of the Ministry of Planning and Investment and of related ministries are 
opportunities for foreign investors to talk about their difficulties in practical operation. 
Nevertheless, correcting and removing the obstacles especially in related ministries are 
very slow. In addition, the meetings are basically held in the capital limiting the 
participation of FIEs located in other provinces. 
 
Policies to promote human capital upgrading include raising public spending on 
education and training, enhancing cooperation between training centers and FIEs and 
targeting these activities more on the poor. This might be of great importance in Vietnam 
since public spending on education has been declining during the reform and education 
has been opened more to the private sector. The resulting fact that the poor have fewer 
chances to upgrade their human capital implies that contribution to growth is smaller than 
it would be and poverty may easily increase. Therefore, well targeted policies may be 
necessary to enable the poor to participate in the increasingly integrated economy. 
Subsidies to children of poor households in participating schools should be applied wider 
and applied to training centers also. Last but not least, cooperation between local training 
centers and FIEs in specifying learning contents should be followed, first in simple 
technology industries and gradually in other high technology ones. Then the positive 
interaction between FDI and human capital and its resulting impact on poverty reduction 
might be intensified.  
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Appendix A 
Provincial Distribution of FDI Commitment at the End of 2001 
 
 IX 
Appendix B  
Accumulated FDI in Vietnam by Country of Origin (December 31, 2000). 
 
Order 
Number 
Country/Territory Number 
of 
Projects 
Investment 
Capital 
Share of the Country’s 
Investment Capital in  Total 
Investment Capital (%) 
1 Singapore 236 6,744,934 18.53 
2 Taiwan 618 4,971,534 13.66 
3 Japan 301 3884108 10.67 
4 South Korea 260 3149661 8.65 
5 Hongkong 208 2689280 7.39 
6 France 108 1829042 5.02 
7 
British Virgin 
Islands 
 
101 
 
1765330 4.85 
8 Russia 34 1607623 4.42 
9 Netherlands 40 1178957 3.24 
10 UK 33 1162095 3.19 
11 Thailand 92 1093502 3.00 
12 Malaysia 79 1011588 2.78 
13 US 107 900730 2.47 
14 Australia 72 745957 2.05 
15 Switherlands 19 521199 1.43 
16 Cayman Island 9 485688 1.33 
17 Germany 32 359653 0.99 
18 Sweden 8 354073 0.97 
19 Bermuda 6 290136 0.80 
20 Philippines 18 260970 0.72 
21 British West Indies 3 219306 0.60 
22 Channel Islands 11 192931 0.53 
23 China 83 165061 0.45 
24 Indonesia 8 113002 0.31 
25 Canada 24 106728 0.29 
26 Denmark 6 105586 0.29 
27 Belgium 12 46803 0.13 
28 New Zealand 6 40659 0.11 
29 Norway 5 39151 0.11 
30 India 9 37436 0.10 
31 Italy 8 36104 0.10 
32 Czeck 4 34929 0.09 
33 Panama 4 29033 0.08 
34 Luxemboug 10 27985 0.08 
35 Ukraine 7 25608 0.07 
36 
Turks & Caicos 
Islands 
 
1 
 
25000 0.07 
37 Liechtenstein 2 23900 0.07 
38 Poland 2 15800 0.04 
 X 
39 Cuba 2 12518 0.03 
40 Iraq 1 15100 0.04 
41 Isle of Man 1 15000 0.04 
42 Laos 3 10804 0.03 
43 Mauritius 1 9000 0.02 
44 Belarus 2 8539 0.02 
45 Western Samoi 2 5600 0.02 
46 Israrel 3 5381 0.01 
47 Bahamas 5 5350 0.01 
48 Austria 5 5345 0.01 
49 North Korea 1 5341 0.01 
50 Cambodia 2 3500 0.00 
51 Belize 1 3000 0.00 
52 Namtu 1 1580 0.00 
53 Sri Lanka 1 1500 0.00 
54 Hungari 3 1374 0.00 
55 Makao 1 800 0.00 
56 Sip 1 500 0.00 
57 Argentina 1 120 0.00 
 Total 2623 36,401,434 100.00 
(Source: MPI, Department for Monitoring Foreign Investment Projects) 
